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You Are Being Watched:
The Need for Notice in Employer
Electronic Monitoring
Mindy C. Calisti'
INTRODUCTION
L IVING in present-day society, it is impossible to avoid the fact that
we are being watched-everywhere. In the past year, we have been
bombarded with news stories about employers eavesdropping on the
phone calls and e-mails of the public relations department', astronaut
Lisa Nowak's discovery of racy e-mails between her love interest and
romantic rival3 , newspaper headlines cautioning Web Surfers Beware: The
Boss Is Watching,4 and the ever-present electronic recordings notifying us
that our phone calls are being "monitored for quality assurance purposes."
Perhaps it is the product of maturing in a technologically driven society, but
third party monitoring has become a customary practice in certain contexts.
Why then is employer monitoring of employee Internet and e-mail usage
such a controversial subject in society and the law? For the majority of
employees, the concern with employer monitoring may have nothing to do
with the employee's reasonable expectation of privacy in the workplace, but
result instead from an expectation of notice when being monitored.
This expectation of notice, however incorrect the assumption may be,
is being perpetuated in the employee privacy context. An ABC News
segment featuring interviews of employees from varied occupations
I B.A. Art History, 2005, University of Kentucky; J.D. expected 2008, University of
Kentucky College of Law. The author would first and foremost like to thank her family for
their support and encouragement throughout her legal education. The author would also like
to thank Jill Fraley for reading an early draft of this Note and for her friendship over these
past three years.
z Molly Selvin &Abigail Goldman, Watchingworkers: a delicate balance Policies on monitoring
staff haven't kept up with technology, raising the risk of missteps, L.A. TIiES, Mar. no, 2007, at Ci.
3 Siri Agrell, Astronaut saw spicy e-mails sent from space; Reading ex-boyfriends raunchy
missives may have launched Nowak's odd mission, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Mar. 7, 2007, at A3.
4 Diane Stafford, Web Surfers Beware: The Boss Is Watching, Prrr. PosT-GAZE-rE, Mar. 4,
2007, atJ-i.
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addressed an employer's right to access its employees' communications.5
One of the featured employees commented that he has:
been of the opinion that because it's company property, both the programs
and the hardware, they should be able ... to look at [e-mails and Internet
usage] ... [Accordingly, there isn't necessarily] an expectation of privacy at
work, so long as ... the company ... makes it known ... that in fact.., they
have monitoring processes in place.6
In addition, many employment publications strongly recommend that
employers offer notice when they begin monitoring their employees.7
However, despite these views, per federal statute, employers are not
required to provide any form of notice!
Although requiring notice when monitoring appears reasonable, only
two states, Delaware and Connecticut, currently mandate that employees
be notified of computer monitoring.' While a recent study from the
American Management Association ("AMA") suggests that 80% of those
surveyed do inform their employees of monitoring,1" the AMA's concept
of what qualifies as notice is highly insufficient. Many employers "notify"
employees through either their new hire orientation materials or the
Intranet. As this "notice" will not reach a large portion of the employee
population, there is a great need for a federal statute to provide uniform
guidelines on employer monitoring and notice.
With 76% of employers monitoring their employees' Web activity," it is
safe to assume that most employers, large and small, are watching electronic
activity. Despite this startling figure, the United States is noticeably lagging
in federal legislation to regulate an employer's right to monitor and to
provide remedies if the employer surpasses those rights. This Note argues
that the United States must enact standardized notice procedures so that
employers have clear guidance on their ability to monitor and employees
can be clearly informed about the scope and timing of the monitoring. Part
I addresses an employee's privacy rights in the workplace by discussing the
Fourth Amendment's reasonable expectation of privacy standard, America's
property rights rationale and the development of workplace monitoring
5 ABC News: Big Brother at Work; Office Spying (ABC television broadcast Dec. 5, zoo6).
6 Id.
7 Lisa J. Sotto & Elisabeth M. McCarthy, An Employer's Guide to US Workplace Privacy
Issues, T iE COMPUTER & INTERNET LAWYER, Jan. 2007, at I. According to the authors, employers
should "clearly inform employees on the full scope of monitoring in an employee handbook
or e-mail to all employees." Id.
8 See infra notes 53-65 and accompanying text.
9 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3i-48d (2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 705(b) (2006).
IO AMA/EPOLICY INSTITUTE RESEARCH, 2OO5 ELECTRONIC MONITORING & SURVEILLANCE
SURVEY I, www.amanet.org/research/pdfs/EMS-summaryo5.pdf.
i Id.
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practices and case law.'" Part II considers the current remedies available
for employees who have been harmed by their employers monitoring.'3
This section argues that the current state of federal law leaves employees
with virtually no remedy when there has been a violation of privacy. Part
III presents an argument for the necessity of notice and includes insight
on two unsuccessful federal bills, the Delaware and Connecticut statutes,
and the European approach to notice and their employer's monitoring. 4
This section will provide guidance on the best methods of developing and
structuring the necessary notification guidelines. While notice may not be
the ultimate answer for the loss of privacy in the face of new technology,
it will provide a workable temporary solution to address the glaring
deficiencies in the current federal privacy legislation.
I. EMPLOYEE PRIVACY IN THE WORKPLACE
When determining whether an employee's privacy rights have been
violated, it ultimately becomes necessary to establish that the employee's
expectation of privacy was reasonable. The reasonable expectation
of privacy had its origin in Katz v. United States. 5 Quoting Harlan's
concurrence in Katz, the court in Smith v. Maryland16 established a two-part
test for determining whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of
privacy. A reasonable expectation of privacy is conditioned upon: (1) an
"actual (subjective) expectation of privacy" and (2) an expectation "that
society is prepared to recognized as reasonable,"' 7 or "'justifiable under the
circumstances."'" The reasonable expectation of privacy standard and the
accompanying two-part test arose in the context of Fourth Amendment
violations. Although a Fourth Amendment violation only occurs when a
state actor19 (which includes public employers) conducts an unreasonable
search and seizure, the standard is relevant to understanding private
employee expectations of privacy and their accompanying cultural and
social justifications.
It is particularly appropriate to examine Fourth Amendment search
and seizure cases that involve the workplace. In the cases that involve
iz See infra notes 15-52 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 53-72 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 73-125 and accompanying text.
15 Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347,353 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
16 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
17 Id. (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361).
18 Id. (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 353).
19 Elbert Lin, Prioritizing Privacy: A Constitutional Response to the Internet, 17 BERKELEY
T"Ec. L.J. io85, 1150 (2002) ("[Tlhe federal constitution is firmly entrenched in the concept
that constitutional rights apply only against state actors"). Seealso Shawn C. Helms, Translating
Privacy Values with Technology, 7 B.U. J. Scl. & -cH. L. 288, 314 (2001).
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an employee's claim on a Fourth Amendment (or the state constitution
equivalent) violation, there are generally two distinct lines of analysis.
Many state courts have applied the Smith v. Maryland standard requiring
that employees demonstrate both prongs in the analysis.2 0 A minority of
states have held that public employees have no reasonable expectation of
privacy at work because they lack a possessory interest in the workplace."'
Continuing the long-standing majority analysis of a limited expectation
of privacy when the employee has notice," a Ninth Circuit case from
2007 provides insight into the type of notice that will trigger this lesser
expectation. In United States v. Ziegler,3 the defendant was charged with
receipt of obscene materials for viewing child pornography Web sites while
at work. Filing a motion to suppress the evidence, the defendant claimed
the computer search, which involved the employer's copying of his hard
drive, was in violation of the Fourth Amendment.2 4 However, the court
held that, although the employee might have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his office, the employer "could give valid consent to a search of
the contents of the hard drive of [the defendant's] workplace computer
because the computer is the type of workplace property that remains within
the control the employer 'even if the employee has placed personal items in
[it].'" 5
Additionally, the Ziegler court noted that because the employer
frequently monitored its employees' Internet activity, and that "upon their
hiring ... employees were apprised of the company's monitoring efforts
through training and an employment manual,"2 16 the defendant "could not
2o In People v. Rodiguez, 69 N.Y.2d 159, 162 (N.Y. 1987), the court held that "[almong
the factors to be considered are whether the individual took precautions to maintain privacy,
the manner in which the individual used the premises and whether the individual had the
right to exclude others from the premises." See also Gatlin v. U.S., 833 A.2d 995, oo5 (D.C.
2003); Cowles v. State, 23 P.3d ii68, 1170 (Alaska 2001); State v. Jimenez, 729 A.2d 693, 696
(R.I. 1999).
21 See Hall v. State, 574 S.E.2d 61o, 613-14 (Ga. Ct. App. zooz).
22 See United States v. Simons, zo6 F3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000) (CIA division's official
Internet usage policy eliminated any reasonable expectation of privacy that employee might
otherwise have in copied files); Muick v. Glenayre Electronics, z8o F3d 741, 743 (7th Cir.
2002) (employee had no reasonable expectation of privacy in laptop files where employer
announced it could inspect laptops it furnished to employees and employer owned laptops);
Wasson v. Sonoma County Junior Coll., 4 F Supp. 2d 893, 905-06 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (employer's
computer policy giving it "the right to access all information stored on [the employer's]
computers" defeats employee's reasonable expectation of privacy in files stored on employer's
computers).
23 United States v. Ziegler, 474 F3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2007).
24 Id. at 1187.
25 Id. at 1191 (quoting O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 716 (1987)) (emphasis added).
26 Id. at 1192.
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reasonably have expected that the computer was his personal property, free
from any type of control by his employer."
' 7
While this decision will confer some privacy rights to protect employees
from unconstitutional searches, 8 it likely will not affect the rights of private
employers to control and monitor employee computer use. However,
unsure of Ziegler's future applications, more employers may be encouraged
to demarcate electronic monitoring guidelines. One commentator noted
that, because the court placed significant emphasis on the employer's
electronic surveillance guidelines, "an employer who has a policy of
monitoring those computers may lawfully access that data and provide it
to the government." 9 The company's monitoring policy in Ziegler, which
included provisions "that the computers were company-owned and not to
be used for activities of a personal nature",30 follows the traditional property
rights argument for monitoring and proved successful in significantly
reducing the employee's expectation of privacy in the workplace.
A. Property Right Rationale and the Lesser Expectation
of Privacy in the Workplace
As Ziegler demonstrates, when dealing with electronic surveillance and the
protection of personal information, American courts generally employ a
property rights approach, which explains the perceived lesser expectation of
privacy in the workplace.3 This approach holds that because "employers
own the work tools, they can initiate surveillance at will."3 The rationales for
this approach are two-fold: (1) "Employees have no reasonable expectation
of privacy when using company e-mail/Internet facilities;" and (2) "The
employer's ownership of these work tools entitle [it] to monitor their use in
any way [it] deems fit."33 Under this rationale, most American employers
have virtually no limits on their ability to monitor their employees e-mail
and Internet usage. Thus, "American employers have what is in effect an
absolute immunity from constitutional, common law, and federal statutory
remedies for abusive surveillance practices, with few exceptions." 34 This
27 Id. (emphasis added).
z8 Id. at 1189. The court found that "employees retain at least some expectation of
privacy in their offices." Id.
29 Mintz Levin Employment, Labor and Benefits Group, United States: Ninth Circuit
Reaffirms Need For Employers To Establish and Communicate Electronic Monitoring Policies,
MONDAQ Bus. BRIEFING, Feb. 7, 2007.
30 Ziegler, 474 E3d at 1192.
31 Karen Eltis, The Emerging Approach to E-Mail Privacy in the Workplace: Its Influence on
Developing Caselaw in Canada and Israel: Should Others Follow Suit', 24 CoMp. LAB. L. & Pot'y
J. 487,499 (2003).
32 Id.
33 Id. at 498.
34 Michael L. Rustad & Sandra R. Paulsson, Monitoring Employee E-Mail and Internet
2oo7-2oo8]
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statement essentially means that most employee claims of a workplace
privacy violation will be decided in favor of the employer.
In addition to not recognizing a reasonable expectation of privacy, some
courts assume that the employer will engage in monitoring. According to
the Seventh Circuit, in Muick v. Glenayre Electronics:
The laptops were [the employer's] property and it could attach whatever
conditions to their use it wanted to. They didn't have to be reasonable
conditions; but the abuse of access to workplace computers is so common
(workers being prone to use them as medium of gossip, titillation, and other
entertainment and distraction) that reserving a right of inspection is so
far from being unreasonable that failure to do so might well be thought
irresponsible.
35
Indeed, in the co-worker harassment context, it may be irresponsible for
the employer not to engage in monitoring. The United States Supreme
Court has held that "an employer can be liable where its own negligence is
a cause of the harassment. An employer is negligent with respect to sexual
harassment if it knew of or should have known about the conduct and failed
to stop it."'36 In this situation, an employer who is aware of the harassment
but fails to investigate (i.e., monitor) may be found negligent.37
With the property rights rationale, employers are not only given the
authority, but are also seemingly encouraged to monitor simply because
they own the computer. This conclusion is supported by the Government's
successful position against the alleged violation of the reasonable expectation
of privacy with a workplace computer in United States v. Ziegler38 In their
brief, the Government argued:
Society could not deem objectively reasonable that privacy interest where
an employee uses a computer paid for by the company; Internet access paid
for by the company, in the company office where the company pays the rent
.... This is certainly even more so true where the company has installed a
firewall and a whole department of people whose job it was to monitor their
employee's Internet activity."
Since the employer owned the computer in issue, the employee had no
reasonable expectation of privacy. The employer had the authority to
monitor in any way it deemed necessary.
Usage: Avoiding the Omniscient Electronic Sweatshop: Insights from Europe, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP.
L. 829, 896 (Summer zoo5).
35 Muick v. Glenayre Elecs., 28o F3d 741 , 743 (7th Cir. 2oo2).
36 Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 759 (1998).
37 See id. at 758.
38 United States v. Ziegler, 474 E3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2007).
39 Ziegler, 474 F3d at 1188-89.
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B. Workplace Investigations
1. Internet Usage and E-mailMonitoring.-In addition to the property rights
argument, there are several other reasons posited for the appropriateness of
employer monitoring, namely:
[1] preventing the misuse of bandwidth as well as the loss of employee
efficiency when employees surf the Internet; [2] ensuring that the company's
networking policies are being .implemented; [3] preventing lawsuits
for discrimination, harassment or other online torts; [4] preventing the
unauthorized transfer of intellectual property and avoiding liability due to
employees making illegal copies of copyrighted materials; [5] safeguarding
company records which must be kept to comply with federal statutes; [6]
deterring the unlawful appropriation of personal information, and potential
spam or viruses; and [7] protecting company assets including intellectual
property and business plans.
°
Whatever reasoning the employer uses, case law has established that
employers are permitted to investigate suspected employee misconduct.
Many companies first began to monitor their employees e-mail or
Internet usage in the early to mid-1990s at a time when very few had
formal monitoring policies in place.4 ' Despite the lack of policies, "[c]ourts
were surprisingly receptive to employers' arguments that the employees
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in workplaces, even where the
company gave the employees no warning that they would be intercepting
electronic communications. ' 4 Thesecourts viewed electronic monitoring
as an acceptable and necessary employer practice. 43
In one of the earliest employer monitoring cases, Smyth v. Pillsbury
Co., the court found no "reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail
communications voluntarily made by an employee to his supervisor over
the company e-mail system notwithstanding any assurances that such
communications would not be intercepted by management."" In the
case, an employee was fired for voluntarily transmitting "inappropriate and
unprofessional comments" over the employer's e-mail system.4 Despite the
employer's assurances that his e-mails would remain confidential, the court
found no reasonable expectation of privacy because the correspondence
had been communicated over the company's system. The court held that
liability would attach only when the "intrusion is substantial and would be
40 Rustad & Paulsson, supra note 34, at 836.
41 Id. at 854.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F Supp. 97, 1oI (E.D. Pa. 1996).
45 Id. at 98-99.
2007-2008]
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highly offensive to the 'ordinary reasonable person," '46 which was not the
situation in this case. Thus, the employee's claim of wrongful termination
in violation of "public policy which precludes an employer from terminating
an employee in violation of the employee's right to privacy" 47 failed since
the employee had no expectation of privacy in the employer's e-mail
system. 48
Adopting reasoning similar to Smyth, the court in McLaren v. Microsoft
Corp. held that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy when the
employer accessed personal folders on his office computer and then released
that information to third parties. 49 According to the court, the e-mails were
not the employee's personal property, but were rather a part of the office
environment.5 0 Therefore, even if the employee did have an expectation
of privacy with regard to those e-mail messages, "the company's interest
in preventing inappropriate and unprofessional comments, or even illegal
activity, over its e-mail system would outweigh [the employee's] claimed
privacy interest in those communications."51
Although they never received notice of the monitoring, the employees
in the aforementioned cases were determined to have an unreasonable
expectation of privacy by courts utilizing the property-based rationale. In
addition to this employer ownership argument, courts have noted additional
justifications for the employer monitoring: the technological resources
are provided to employees for business activity uses and the monitoring
enhances productivity while preventing fraud and theft." The numerous
acceptable rationales for surveillance and the limited number of private
sector employer monitoring cases coupled with the limited remedies
available for employees result in a high probability that the employee
will be unsuccessful in their suit. However, one significant way to hold
employers more accountable is to require that they provide notification to
employees before monitoring, and to provide sufficient remedies when the
employers fail to comply.
46 Id. at 100 (quoting Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F2d 61 1,621 (3d Cir. 1992)).
According to the court, "in determining whether an alleged invasion of privacy is substantial
and highly offensive to a reasonable person, the Court of Appeals predicted that Pennsylvania
would adopt a balancing test which balances the employee's privacy interest against the
employer's interest in maintaining a drug-free workplace." Id.
47 Id. at 1oo.
48 Id. at ioi.
49 McLaren v. Microsoft Corp., No. 05-97-oo824, 1999 WL 339015 (Tex. App. May 28,
1999).
50 Id. at *4.
51 Id. at *5.
52 See, e.g., Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, ioo(E.D. Pa. 1996); McLaren, 1999 WL
339015, at *5; Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 E Supp. 1232 (D. Nev. 1996).
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II. CURRENT "REMEDIES" FOR EMPLOYEES
American employees in the private sector have no constitutional remedy
against employer monitoring, even when implemented in a discriminatory
fashion and without notice. 3 Thus, a private sector employee must look
elsewhere if he believes the employer's monitoring violated his reasonable
expectation of privacy. Unfortunately for the private employee, "the
current state of the law is that private employees have no constitutional,
federal statutory, or common law remedies to redress employer abuses of
e-mail or Internet monitoring.' ' 4 Thus, without a change in the law, many
employee privacy suits will be unsuccessful.
A. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
The most fundamental protection for the privacy of electronic
communications is found in the Electronic Communication Privacy Act
("ECPA"). 55 Employees disciplined or fired because of their e-mail or
Internet usage typically include a claim seeking redress under the ECPA.
According to the "Title I" of the federal statute, it is unlawful for any person
to "intentionally intercept[s], endeavor to intercept, or procure[s] any other
person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic
communication." 6  Under "Title II," it is a federal crime if a person
"intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through which an
electronic communication service is provided . . . and thereby obtains,
alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic communication
"57
Although the language of Title I and II technically covers private
employers, employee monitoring is not significantly limited by the ECPA.
Several statutory exceptions or defenses come to the employer's rescue.
Title I contains exceptions for "business use in the ordinary course
of business," "providers of communication systems," and "consent."5 "
Likewise, Title II covers exceptions for "providers of communications"
and "authorization by users of communications systems."59 In addition to
53 Rustad & Paulsson,supra note 34, at 841.
54 Id. at 843.
55 Gail Lasprogata, Nancy J. King & Sukanya Pillay, Regulation of Electronic Employee
Monitoring: Identifying Fundamental Prnciples of Employee Privacy Through a Comparative Study
of Data Privacy Legislation in the European Union, United States and Canada, 2oo4 STAN. ThCH.
L. REV. 1, 72 (2004).
56 The Wiretap Act, I8 U.S.C. § 2511 (1986).
57 The Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (1986).
58 Jay P. Kesan, Cyber-Working or Cyber-Shrinking?: A First Principles Examination of
Electronic Privacy in the Workplace, 54 FLA. L. REV. 289, 296 (2002).
59 Lasprogata ct al., supra note 55, at 73-
2oo7-2oo8]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
the statutory exceptions, the majority of cases under the Act have held
that the "interception of e-mails must occur contemporaneously with
their transmission to violate the ECPA. Based on this interpretation of
'intercept,' an employer who retrieves e-mail from an employee's mailbox
following the transmission of the e-mail has not violated the Wiretap Act."
6
0
If an employer meets one of the exceptions or defenses, the EPCA does not
place any restrictions on the monitoring, and it does not require employee
notification of the monitoring. According to one commentator on the
matter, in light of the "breadth of the exceptions under the EPCA and the
ability of companies to adopt comprehensive electronic communications
policies, it will be difficult for employees to sue their employers under the
EPCA for electronic monitoring in the workplace.
61
A recent case helps illustrate the pro-employer exceptions which make
an employee's EPCA claim all but impossible. In Fraser v. Nationwide
Mutual Insurance Co.,6 the employer, fearing that an employee might have
been disseminating confidential information to a competitor, searched
the employee's e-mails that were stored on the company's server. Once
his employment was terminated, the employee brought an action against
the employer, including damages claims under both Titles I and II of the
ECPA. The Third Circuit rejected the employee's claims, holding that
"an 'intercept' under the ECPA must occur contemporaneously with
transmission." 63 Since the employer read the messages while they were
in storage, the court ruled that they did not "intercept" the e-mails within
the meaning of the ECPA.64 Since most employers' behavior in electronic
surveillance will be similar to Nationwide's, it will be unlikely that an
employer's monitoring would violate the "interception" provision. As long
as the employers' meet one of the vast exceptions, most commonly by being
the provider of the workplace e-mail system, "they may access employees'
stored e-mail messages (regardless of the originator's designation of them as
personal or professional) and are exempt from liability under the ECPA."6
B. Common Law Privacy Rights
The ECPA never indicated that it was preempting other remedies for
privacy protection. Thus, employees technically may have other remedies
under the common law for invasive employer monitoring. Most attempts
by the employees to assert an invasion of privacy claim, however, have
60 Matthew E. Swaya & Stacey R. Eisenstein, Emerging Technology in the Workplace, 21
LAB. LAW. 1, 11 (2005).
61 Lasprogata et al., supra note 55, at 74.
62 Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F3d 107 (3d Cir. 2003).
63 Id. at 113.
64 Swaya & Eisenstein, supra note 60, at 12.
65 18 'T ACY BISHOP HOLTON, CAUSES OF ACTION (SECOND SERIES) § 87 (2006).
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returned in favor of the employer.' Similar to actions brought under the
ECPA, private employee common law privacy claims have tended to be
futile.
In the employment context, the most common privacy claim is intrusion
of seclusion which requires the employee to establish that "he had a
reasonable expectation of privacy and that the employer's review of the
private information would be highly offensive to a reasonable person."
67
There is technically a third element, the intrusion, but it is generally a non-
issue as courts accept the electronic monitoring as sufficient to establish
the requirement. 68 When dealing with these types of claims, "courts will
first define the scope of an employee's reasonable expectation of privacy
and then balance the employer's business interest against the employee's
individual rights. Courts [then] treat the workplace environment, the reason
for the intrusion, and the means employed as factors to be considered.
69
The employer can establish the employee's anticipated reasonable
expectation of privacy by communicating their electronic monitoring
policy to their employees; furthermore, it should be relatively easy for the
employer to provide legitimate business reasons for the monitoring.70 It is
argued that employers can insulate themselves from common law privacy
liability by notifying employees of their electronic monitoring program. 7'
However, courts have been receptive to arguments that employees have no
reasonable expectation of privacy, even when the employer gave no notice
of their monitoring.
72
III. WORKPLACE MONITORING AND NOTICE
IN THE UNITED STATES AND ABROAD
A. Why Notice?
Given the pro-employer stance of most American courts, notice of the
surveillance should be mandatory. This notice will afford protection to
both employees and employers once electronic monitoring occurs. Notice
significantly decreases the employee's reasonable expectation of privacy,
and thus helps further insulate the employer from liability. Further, it can
establish the e-mail and Internet activity deemed inappropriate, and will
give employees a better understanding of the conduct that would violate the
employment policies. Notice can additionally have a deterrence effect-it
66 JANET G. PAYTON, CORPORATE COUNSEL'S GUIDE TO PRIVACY, § 7:6 (2006).
67 Kesan, supra note 58, at 302.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 303.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 3o4.
72 Rustad & Paulsson, supra note 34, at 854.
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might deter some employers from engaging in unlawful monitoring, and it
would certainly deter many employees from engaging in conduct that could
be grounds for termination. The examples discussed below, including
two failed federal statutes, current state statutes, and the laws of Europe
should provide a working framework for future federal legislation which is
decidedly needed in the United States.
B. The Proposed Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act
In the early 1990s, several bills appeared in Congress that intended to
deal with the noticeable gaps of the ECPA.7 3 One such bill, the Privacy
for Consumers and Workers Act ("PWCA"), attempted to constrain the
exceptions businesses were granted by the ECPA.74 The proposed statute's
language indicated that it intended to "prohibit the collection, storage,
analysis or reporting of information concerning an employee's activities by
means of... electronic observation and supervision ... which is conducted
by any method other than direct observation by another person."75 Further,
the PCWA would have provided the employee with the "right to know"
the details of the monitoring, namely, where and when the monitoring
would occur and how the employer planned to use the evidence.76 The
employer would also have been required to notify the employee once the
surveillance actually occurred and this notification could be accomplished
through a signal light, beeping tone, verbal warning or other system." With
its numerous constraints on the employer and the failure to account for
different business monitoring needs, the ambitious bill did not survive."
However, the PCWA is useful in that it provides some guidance as to the
form and content of notice that the drafters and critics found reasonable.
C. The Proposed Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act
Nearly a decade after PWCA failed to pass, Congress introduced the
Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act ("NEMA") in 2000. Although NEMA
intended to enhance employee privacy rights, this proposed bill did not put
any restrictions on monitoring; rather it required notice at specified times
throughout the employee's tenure.79 "NEMA acknowledges that, while
73 Kesan, supra note 58, at 299.
74 Id.
75 Jill Yung, Big Brother is Watching: How Employee Monitoring in 2004 Brought Orwells 1984
to Life and What the Law ShouldDo About It, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 163,205 (2005).
76 Lee Nolan Jacobs, Is What's Yours Really Mine?: Shmueli v. Corcoran Group and
Penumbral Property Rights, 14 J.L. & Poi'V 837, 863 (oo6).
77 Id.
78 Yung, supra note 75, at 206.
79 William R. Corbett, The Need for a Revitalized Common Law of the Workplace, 69 B ROOK.
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employees should not have an expectation of privacy in e-mail voluntarily
sent, stored, or received on the company's system, the employees are entitled
to clear notice from employers who choose to exercise their monitoring
rights." 0 This rationale made it much less ambitious and more focused
than its predecessor; however, this did not change its ultimate outcome.
Had it been enacted, NEMA would have required that employers
give notice when electronic monitoring would be taking place. Sufficient
notice in this context would have required the employer to describe the
form of communication that would be monitored, the means by which the
monitoring would be accomplished, the kind of information that would be
obtained, the frequency of the monitoring, and how the information would
be gathered.8" The bill appeared to find a point of compromise between
employers and employees, and during the hearings, testimony by James
Dempsey, from the Center of Democracy and Technology, seems to sum
up the middle ground: "the bill merely requires employers to tell their
employees in advance what types of monitoring they will be subject to. Yet
this alone will go a long way to restoring to workers their sense of dignity,
which is a large part of the concept of privacy."8
NEMA intended to amend section 2711 in Title 18 of the United States
Code, and would have read:
Except as provided in subsection (c), an employer who intentionally, by
any electronic means, reads, listens to, or otherwise monitors any wire
communication, oral communication of an employee of the employer, or
otherwise monitors the computer usage of an employee of the employer,
without first having provided the employee notice meeting the requirements
of subsection (b) shall be liable to the employee for relief as provided in
subsection (d). 3
The timing requirement insisted that the employer give notice at three
occasions: before the electronic monitoring occurred, when the employee
began his employment, and annually after that.8"
Despite being hailed as "part of the answer to one of the major
concerns of the American public today-the loss of privacy in the face of
new technology,""s Congress failed to pass NEMA. As is often the case,
L. REV. 91, 115 (2003).
8o Meir S. Hornung, Note, Think Before You Type: A Look at E-mail Privacy in the Workplace,
i i FORDIIAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 15, 156 (2005).
81 Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act, H.R. 4908, io6th Cong. § 271i(b) (zooo).
82 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 2ooo, Digital Privacy Act of 2ooo and Notice
of Electronic Monitoring Act: Hearing on H.R. 5o18, H.R. 4987 and H.R. 4908 Before the House
Subcomm. on the Const. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, i o6th Cong. (zooo) (statement of James X.
Dempsey, Center for Democracy and Technology).
83 H.R. 4908 § 271 i(a)(i) (emphasis added).
84 H.R. 4908 § 2711 (a)(2).
85 Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act: Hearing on H.R. 4908 Before the Subcomm. on
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critical concerns outweighed the praise. 6 Congress shelved NEMA in late
September of 2000 because of "concerns [expressed] 'by various business
and employer coalitions . . . [regarding] the potential for an 'increase in
employment litigation .-8' The strongest criticism involved the lack of
delineated methods of notice. The employer groups claimed that by merely
requiring that "clear and conspicuous notice" be given might give rise to
more litigation because the employee could claim his advance notice was
neither clear nor conspicuous.88 In addition, critics claimed NEMA would
impose too great a burden on employers. As was duly noted, however, "if
a company has the resources to engage in employee monitoring, it should
have the resources, to issue notices to each employee."89 The failure of
both the PCWA and NEMA does not paint an optimistic picture for future
efforts for electronic monitoring legislation. However, these unsuccessful
statutes as well as the state laws mentioned below provide guidelines for
future efforts of federal legislation.
D. State Laws Requiring Notice
Very few states regulate employers' monitoring of e-mail and Internet
activity. However, the statutes and case law discussed below provide
guidance as to both the content and frequency of notice that can and should
be provided to employees before electronic surveillance is conducted.
Most state laws mirror Title III of the EPCA "and therefore similarly do
not prohibit employer monitoring of e-mail."'  However, both Delaware
and Connecticut modeled their statute after NEMA, and therefore give
employees greater protection and remedies against employer surveillance
conducted without prior notice.
1. Connecticut and Delaware.-Clearly evoking the language of NEMA,
Connecticut General Statute section 31-48d provides that "each employer
who engages in any type of electronic monitoring shall give prior written
notice to all employees who may be affected, informing them of the types
the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, io6th Cong. (2000) (testimony of James X.
Dempsey, Center for Democracy and Technology).
86 Yung, supra note 75, at 208. One such critic Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director of
the Electronic Privacy Information Center, "accused the law of being counterproductive for
employees, whose reasonable expectation of privacy would be undermined by an employer's
provision of notice." Id.
87 Id.
88 Nathan Watson, Note, The Private Workplace and the Proposed "Notice of Electronic
Monitoring Act:" Is "Notice" Enough?, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 79,97(200).
89 Id at 98.
90 Victor Schachter, Privacy in the Workplace, in SIXTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY LAW:
DATA PROTECTION-THE CONVERGENCE OF PRIVACY AND SECURITY 153, 209 (Practicing Law
Institute 2005).
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of monitoring which may occur.'" According to the statutory language,
every employer, regardless of their size must post "in a conspicuous place
•.. [written] notice concerning the types of electronic monitoring which
the employer may engage in.""2 This type of posting will be enough
to constitute prior written notice, and an employee's continued use of
employer-provided equipment after the notification may indicate consent
to monitoring. 93
Strikingly similar to the Connecticut statute, Delaware requires that
prior notice be given to employees before an employer may monitor e-
mails or Internet usage. 94 Originally, however, the statute only required that
notice be given once and that it be signed by the employee.9 The statute
was amended to its current form in 2002, and is now much more protective
of the employee's workplace privacy rights. The most significant change to
section 705(b) was, " (1)[Employer must] [p]rovide[s] an electronic notice of
such monitoring or intercepting policies or activities to the employee at least
once during each day the employee accesses the employer-provided e-mail or
Internet access services; or (2) Has first given a 1-time notice to the employee of
such monitoring or intercepting activity orpolicies."96 According to the statute
then, the notice must either be provided on a daily basis or be acknowledged
by employee. If notice takes the form of (2), it is not required to be in
writing; instead, notice can also take the form of an electronic record or any
other electronic form that the employee acknowledges either in writing or
electronically.97
2. California.-Unlike Connecticut and Delaware, California does not
have a statute regulating notice and monitoring. Despite the absence of
state legislation, California courts have held that "employees do not have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in their e-mail messages, provided they
are given adequate notice of monitoring and searching."' The court in Bourke v.
Nissan Motor Corp. held that the employee had no reasonable expectation
of privacy because forms signed by employees advised them that company
91 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-48d (b) (1) (zoo6) (emphasis added).
92 Id.
93 Ira David, Privacy Concerns Regarding the Monitoring of Instant Messaging in the Workplace:
Is it Big Brother or Just Business?, 5 NEv. L.J. 319, 331 (2oo4).
94 1 L. CAMILLE HEBERT, EMPL. PRIVACY LAW § 8A:z2 (2OO6).
95 Id.
96 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 705(b) (2OO6) (emphasis added).
97 Id.
98 Victor Schachter & Shawna M. Swanson, Workplace Privacy and Monitoring: New
Developments Affecting the Rights of Employers and Employees, in SEVENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE
ON PRIVACY LAW: EVOLVING LAWS AND PRACTICES IN A SECURITY-DRIVEN WORLD 135, 149
(Practicing Law Institute 2oo6) (emphasis added).
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computers were to be used for "business purposes only." In light of the
employee's signature on the "Computer Use Registration Policy" and their
knowledge that random e-mails were reviewed to ensure compliance, the
court rejected the employee's invasion of privacy claims.' °°
In addition to the relevant court decisions, California proposed an
electronic monitoring bill during the 2003-2004 session. Had it passed,
this bill would have required employers to provide notice to employees
of their intent to monitor and collect information about their electronic
activities. 10 1 The law was intended to be a notice statute-"employers
would have simply been required to provide a warning that specified the
activities, including those not related to the employer's business, that
would be monitored and a description of the information sought through
this process."'' 0 2 Despite passing in both houses, the bill was vetoed by
Governor Schwarzenegger. 3
E. Notice and Employee Monitoring in Europe
Unlike America's property rights regime, European countries operate
under a human rights model when addressing employee privacy rights.
While these countries recognize that employers have legitimate interests
in ensuring the productivity of their businesses and protecting themselves
against liability by their employees, the European Union has made it clear
that, with regard to employee privacy in the workplace, the employee's
human dignity trumps the other considerations. 10 As a result, "European
employers ... are required to give employees clear and conspicuous
note about notice. If actual notice of surveillance is not established,
any interception of electronic communications is considered to be
unlawful."10s
In addition to utilizing the human rights rationale, the European
Commission adopted a Directive on Privacy and Electronic
Communication in 2002. i0 The directive states that "the confidentiality
of communications prohibits the practice of interception or surveillance of
private communications between others over networks .... Gaining access
99 Bourke v. Nissan Motor Corp, No. Bo68, 705 Cal. App. 2d (July 26, 1993) (unpublished
opinion), available at http://www.loundy.com/CASES/Bourke-v.Nissan.html.
ioO Id.
ioi Yung, supra note 75, at 209.
1O2 Id. at 210.
1o3 Id.
104 Lasprogata et al., supra note 55, at 24.
105 Rustad & Paulsson, supra note 34, at 897.
io6 It is important to note that all European Directives are not themselves a law, instead
they are "a direction to the member states to enact implementing legislation consistent with
its privacy protection obligations." Lasprogata, supra note 55, at 5o.
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to or storing information from a user's terminal.., is only allowed if the user is
given clear information about the purpose of any such invisible activity and
is offered the right to refuse it.",10 7 While this directive does not necessarily
include internal work e-mails, if the private employees access a public
network, they are automatically protected by the directive.'10
Since there are no European Union regulations or directives which
are specifically intended for electronic employee monitoring, the Article
29 Working Party'09 has attempted to fill the void themselves. Issuing
the 2001 Working Opinion and the 2002 Working Document, they have
established guidelines that identify the acceptable limits on an employer's
ability to electronically monitor.'10 According to these documents, "[b]efore
employer monitoring activity can be considered lawful and justified, the
employer must comply with seven fundamental data protection principles:
necessity, finality, transparency, legitimacy, proportionality, data accuracy,
and security.""' Of particular note, the "transparency requirement"
mandates that the employer be open and clear about their activities. While
not requiring a written policy, "the transparency rule dictates that employers'
monitoring practices befully and clearly disclosed to all employees subject to
the policy, along with the reasons for the monitoring."' '2
In addition to the abovementioned directives, when a European
employer implements an electronic surveillance policy, it "must adhere
to the privacy regulations in each member state in which it is subject to
enforcement jurisdiction.""' Discussed below are a few of the member
states' legislation and court decisions with particular emphasis on the
requirement of notice in the employer monitoring context.
1. France.-In France, "[an employer's right to monitor and to interfere
with an employee's personal affairs is prohibited under the Employment
Code unless the interference is in accordance with the purpose and in
proportion to the reason of the interference."" 4 Even if the exceptions
are met, information of a personal nature cannot be collected unless the
French employer has "clearly informed his employees about it and the
information about the monitoring is easily available.""'
107 Rustad & Paulsson, supra note 34, at 880 (emphasis added).
io8 Id.
io9 An advisory and independent group which is comprised of representatives from all
27 EU Member States.
hio Lasprogata et al., supra note 55, at 39.
iii Id. at 41.
1i 2 Id. at 44 (emphasis added).
113 Id. at 5i.
114 Rustad & Paulsson, supra note 34, at 892.
115 Id.
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One French case marks the distinct difference in employee privacy
between France and the United States. In SocieteNikon Francev. M. Onof, the
court held that the employer had no legal right to intercept an employee's
personal e-mails, even if the employer is the supplier of the computer and
expressly stated that the computers were not for personal uses.116 The
Court of Cassation declared that "it would be a violation of a fundamental
freedom, namely the right to privacy and secrecy of correspondence, for
an employer to read personal messages sent or received by their employee
on a computer belonging to the employer and used by the employee for
work." ' According to the court, the employer has a general right to monitor
e-mail or Internet communications only if the employer has complied with
the notice requirement and can prove that the employee had actual notice
of the employer's monitoring."'
2. England.-The electronic surveillance of British employees must
comply with the country's implementation of the European Directive on
Data Protection. The U.K. Data Protection Act (DPA) provides a remedy
for the victims of electronic surveillance. "The DPA requires the 'data
controller,' the one processing the information, to notify employees about
the monitoring system as well as protect the data."ll 9 There is one exception
to the notice requirement-if the purpose of the employer's monitoring
is to prevent a specific crime, then surveillance without notification is
permitted.2 0
Additionally, the Employment Practices Data Protection Code'' ("U.K.
Code") is intended to give British employers guidance for their compliance
with the United Kingdom's Data Protection Act ("DPA"). According to
the U.K. Code, employer monitoring is lawful under the DPA so long
as the guidelines in the Code are followed. Most specifically, the U.K.
Code recommends that the transparency and proportionality principles be
followed. "Employers wishing to electronically monitor their employees
must notify employees and any other party to the communication that they
are being monitored (transparency) and must eliminate the collection of
personal information that is 'irrelevant or excessive' to the employment
relationship (proportionality)."'2 2  In addition, the U.K. Code provides
I I6 Id. at 893-94 (emphasis added).
117 Yohei Suda, Monitoring E-Mail of Employees in the Private Sector: a Comparison Between
Western Europe and the United States, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 209, 255 (2005).
118 Rustad & Paulsson, supra note 34, at 892.
H19 Id. at 886.
120 Id. at 886-87.
121 UNITED KINGDOM INFORMATION COMMISSIONER, 'THE EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
DATA PROTECTION CODE: PART 3: MONITORING AT WORK (2003), available at http://www.
privacydataprotection.co.uk/pdf/employment code_ofL practice.pdf.
122 Lasprogata et al., supra note 55, at 60.
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recommendations to employers utilizing electronic monitoring software,
including: "wherever possible avoid opening e-mails, especially ones that
clearly show they are private or personal... [and] where practicable, ensure
that those sending e-mails to workers, as well as workers themselves, are
aware of any monitoring and the purpose behind it."' 3
3. Germany.-A few recent German cases suggest that their courts also
favor employee notice before the employer's electronic surveillance
can occur. According to the cases, "German employers may retrieve an
employee's personal electronic communications only if in furtherance of a
valid business interest, the employee has been given notice, and the rules
governing Internet connection and e-mail use applied by the employer have
been agreed to by the employee's elected work council."'1 4 Additionally,
the employee who violates the employer's monitoring policies cannot be
terminated without having first received formal notice of his violation.
According to the Regional Labor Court of Hessen, a general warning to all
employees is insufficient to uphold an employee's termination without first
providing a formal warning to the violating employee. I"5
CONCLUSION: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROPER NOTICE
As the court in United States v. Bailey held, "an employer's notice to an
employee that workplace files, Internet use, and e-mail may be monitored
undermines the reasonableness of an employee's claim that he or she
believed such information was private and not subject to search."' 6 Notice
of employer monitoring, then, is necessary for the protection of employee
privacy and employer surveillance procedures. As has been discussed, if
the employer notifies his employees that an electronic monitoring program
is in place, the employee's reasonable expectation of privacy in the
workplace is decreased significantly.2 7 Thus, notice of potential monitoring
actually works to the employer's advantage because it virtually ensures the
employer's success against an invasion of privacy lawsuit. Furthermore, it
helps to remove the stigma that the employer is spying on his employees.
123 James M. Jordan III, Recent Developments in Workplace Privaty Outside the U.S., in
SEVENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY LAW: EVOLVING LAWS AND PRACTICES IN A SECURITY-
DRIVEN WORLD 231, 277-78 (Practicing Law Institute 2oo6).
124 Lasprogata et al., supra note 55, at 55 (emphasis added).
125 Id.
IZ6 U.S. v. Bailey, 272 F. Supp. 2d 822, 835 (D. Nebraska 2003).
127 See supra notes 74-104 and accompanying text; see also Garrity v. John Hancock Mut.
Life. Ins. Co., No. CIV. A. oo-12143-RWZ, 2002 WL 974676, at *I (D. Mass. May 7, 2002)
(where the court dismissed employees' claims of invasion of privacy based on their employer's
reading of their e-mail on the employer's computer system).
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The employees would be fully aware that the monitoring is occurring and
could therefore alter their conduct appropriately.
One recommendation is to provide both notice and reasoning before an
employer engages in electronic monitoring. "Employers gain a valuable
measure of protection by providing clear and specific notice to employees
of their legitimate business interests and their policies regarding screening,
monitoring and investigating employees' conduct.""I The employer should
establish a reasonable and logical connection between their legitimate
business interests and the conduct they are attempting to control.,2 9 To
make notice more effective, the United States should require that notice
of potential monitoring be clearly and conspicuously placed in several
locations, including but not limited to the company's Intranet, any employee
manuals and the employee break room. In terms of timing, notice should
also be given at the time of hiring and directly before any monitoring is to
occur. This will ensure that the employee actually had a limited reasonable
expectation of privacy. While notice may not be the most effective way to
deal with the electronic surveillance issues, it is a reasonable and successful
solution in Europe, Delaware and Connecticut. The federal government
should follow suit and enact legislation that requires notice; it will provide
a good foundation for future discussions and will lessen employee concerns
regarding expectations of privacy in the workplace.
128 Schachter, supra note 90, at 245.
129 Id.
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